On Sept. 30, the Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District issued a decision in the case of Berkley People’s Alliance v. City of Berkeley overturning the lower court’s order dismissing the case. The appellate court held that recessing a public meeting and reconvening in another room does not comply with the Brown Act’s authorization to order the original meeting room cleared when attempting to address a disruption of the meeting. The case arose from actions by the Berkeley City Council in response to disruptions caused by members of the public at three different meetings. On each occasion, after determining that the disruption made it so that the council could not conduct city business during the meeting, the Mayor recessed the meeting and the council reconvened in a new location. Members of the media were permitted to attend the reconvened meetings in person, while members of the public could not be present in person but could attend via video. The Berkeley People’s Alliance then sued the city, arguing that the response to the disruption violated the Brown Act.
The city relied on Government Code Section 54957.9, a section of the Brown Act that allows an exception to the open meeting requirement. Specifically, it provides that a legislative body may clear the room in the case of disruption and proceed without the public present (except members of the media). The court found that this section does not authorize relocating a meeting in an effort to continue without disruption and that the city’s actions violated the Brown Act.
To reach this conclusion, the court relied on the plain language of Section 54957.9, which states in the relevant part, “In the event that any meeting is willfully interrupted by a group or groups of persons so as to render the orderly conduct of such meeting unfeasible and order cannot be restored by the removal of individuals who are willfully interrupting the meeting, the members of the legislative body conducting the meeting may order the meeting room cleared and continue in session.” [Emphasis added.] Through analysis of the meaning of “cleared” in this context of the code language, the court concluded that the code language “allows member of a legislative body to command that the room in which the meeting is taking place be emptied of its occupants or freed from obstruction.” Thus, the Brown Act does not allow recessing the meeting and reconvening in a new location in the case of disruption.
Further, the court concluded that statutory language that allows a legislative body to “continue in session” does not include authorization for relocation of a meeting. According to the court, this conclusion is strengthened by the fact that Section 54957.9 requires media members who were not disruptive to be permitted to continue their attendance but notice of a new location is not described in the statute. Based on this, the court concluded that Section 54957.9 intends for a meeting to continue in the original location after the disruption is addressed by clearing the room. The court did not consider an argument made by the Berkeley People’s Alliance that the Brown Act required the city council to first attempt to remove the disruptive individuals before taking alternative actions.
Through this statutory analysis, the court found the city’s arguments supporting the recessing and reconvening of a disrupted meeting in another location unpersuasive in light of the statute’s plain language and reversed the lower court’s order. As a result, the case will return to the lower court for further proceedings. Practically speaking, it would be far easier to recess and reconvene than to remove members of the public. However, based on this opinion, local educational agency boards should ensure that, in the event that they need to clear the room in the case of a disruption, the board remains in the room in which the meeting began rather than reconvening in a separate room.
